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Abstract
SAE ARP 4754 has been widely applied in the process of airworthiness certification in highly-integrated or 
complex electronic system of civil aircraft since 1996. But with the complexity of integration and function 
increasing in the system design process, the standard can not fully meets the state-of-art technical requirements
of designer and engineers. Hence the new version SAE ARP 4754A arises in December 2010, which mainly
revises the part of development assurance level allocation, provids a methodology to assign the correct 
development assurance levels. In order to better understand and apply ARP 4754A in the field of airworthiness 
and safety, this paper will compare SAE ARP 4754A and 4754 on aspects of applicable scope, development 
process and integral process, etc, expecting to make clear the differences and carry on analysis about the 
differences to show the significances of the changes for civil aircraft airworthiness and safety.
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1. Introduction
The transport airplane airworthiness standards such as FAR, JAR, and CCAR make a mandatory requirement
to the public airplane basic safety, hence, the FAA requests SAE to define the appropriate nature and scope of 
system-level information for demonstrating regulatory compliance for highly integrated or complex avionic 
systems. SAE ARP 4754 “Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems” has 
been widely applied in the process of airworthiness certification in highly-integrated or complex electronic 
system of civil aircraft since 1996, and provides the common basis for airworthiness certification of highly 
integrated or complex aircraft system. So it plays a major role in ensuring and improving civil aircraft 
airworthiness and greatly promotes the development level of civil aircraft.
But when following the SAE ARP 4754, some problem arises, such as there is no datail guidance to assign 
development assurance level. So there is a need for a methodology to assign development assurance level in the 
development process. To solve the problem, SAE has been revising the ARP 4754 for a long time and releases
ARP 4754A “Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems” in December 2010. The new version
provides guidelines for civil aircraft and system development, and provides a detailed method to ensure the right 
allocation of development assurance level. As there are so many attentions from the user of SAE ARP 4754, and 
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there exist some significant differences between SAE ARP 4754A and 4754 on some aspects, such as scope,
nature and contents, this paper will introduce and compare the contents and differences between ARP 4754A 
and 4754.
2. Comparison of SAE ARP 4754A and ARP 4754
2.1. Scope and nature
SAE ARP 4754 is applicable to:
z Highly-integrated system: refers to perform or contribute to multiple aircraft-level functions
z Complex system: refers to systems whose safety cannot be shown solely by test
SAE ARP 4754A is applicable to:
z Aircraft
z Systems that implement aircraft functions
ARP 4754 has been prepared primarily for electronic systems which, by their nature, may be complex and 
are readily adaptable to high levels of integration. However, the guidance is also applicable to engine systems 
and related equipment. ARP 4754A provides updated and expanded guidelines for the processes used to develop 
civil aircraft and systems that implement aircraft functions. This indicates that ARP 4754A not only covers the 
scope of ARP 4754, but also includes guidelines for developing aircraft.
Besides the difference about applicable object, there are some other difference on the aspect of scope
betweent them. ARP 4754 was developed in the context of Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) and Joint 
Airworthiness Requirements (JAR) Part25, but ARP 4754A was developed in the context of 14CFR25 and 
EASA CS-25ARP 4754. In the ARP 4754, more detailed coverage of the software aspects of design are dealt 
with in RTCA document DO-178B, and its EUROCAE counterpart, ED-12B. Coverage of complex hardware
aspects of design are dealt with in RTCA document DO-xxx. But in the ARP 4754A, more detailed coverage of 
the software aspects of development are found in RTCA document DO-178B, and its EUROCAE counterpart, 
ED-12B. Coverage of electronic hardware aspects of development are found in RTCA document DO-
254/EUROCAE ED-80. At the same time, design guidance and certification considerations for integrated 
modular avionics are found in appropriate RTCA/EUROCAE document DO-297/ED-124. ARP 5150 ĀSafety 
Assessment of Transport Airplanes In Commercial Serviceā and ARP 5151 ĀSafety Assessment of General 
Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft In Commercial Serviceāoutline details for in-service safety assessment.
Both of SAE ARP 4754 and 4754A reference SAE ARP 4761ĀGuidelines and Methods for Conducting the 
Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipmentā to outline the methodologies for safety 
assessment processes. It indicates that ARP 4754A does not only include the development phase of aircraft and 
system, but also include service and operational phases. The differences are shown in Fig1.
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Fig. 1. Guideline documents covering development and in-service/operational phases
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2.2. Contents
Compared with ARP 4754, ARP 4754A adds development planning process phase, refines development 
process of aircraft and systemˈ summarises general methods of aircraft and system, refines assignment 
principles, methodˈguideline and process of development assurance level. The following will show these 
differences in detail.
2.2.1. Planning process
In ARP 4754A, the planning process which is done before the development process of aircraft and system is
to define the means of producing an aircraft or system which satisfies the aircraft/system requirements and to 
provide the level of confidence which is consistent with airworthiness requirements. Fig2 is an example of the 
overall planning process and includes some generic objectives applicable to all planning elements. The basic 
process shown in Fig 2 suggests that all of the planning elements need to be thought about before documenting 
any of them.
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Fig 1 Planning process
Compared with the ARP 4754, development planning process in the ARP 4754A is an important activity 
before development proces of civil aircraft and system. It identifies all the planning elements, include: 
development, safety program, requirements management, validation, implementation verification, configuration 
management, process assurance, certification.
2.2.2. Aircraft and system development process
This section provides an overview of a generic approach for developing aircraft and aircraft systems from 
conceptual definition to certification. Fig3 is a simple illustration of a development life cycle. The development 
life cycle has a beginning and an end, and can be re-entered to address aircraft or system changes. The Concept 
phase (i.e. research and preliminary development phase) determines the overall aircraft performance and 
configuration. The Development phase follows the Concept phase readying the implementation for 
Production/Operation.
Function Architecture Design Implementation
Production,
test &
operation data
Concept Development Production/
Operation
Fig. 3. Development life cycle
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Compared with ARP 4754, ARP 4754A covers Concept phase, Development phase, and 
Production/Operation phase of aircraft and system development. By doing so it expands development life cycle,
and thus ensures and improves reliability and safety of aircraft and related products.
2.2.3. Integral process
SAE ARP 4754, RTCA DO-178B, RTCA DO-254 and SAE ARP 4761 constitute materials for safety 
analysis of airborne systems, especially for highly integrated and complex system. Among them, ARP 4754
provides a guidance to assign DAL to highly integrated or complex aircraft systems, subsystem, equipment, 
hardware, software, spare parts and item. The system development assurance level is assigned based on the most 
severe failure condition classification associated with the applicable aircraft-level function(s) (see Tab 1). Tab 1
table departs slightly from AC 25.1309-1A and AMJ 25.1309 by establishing level E as “no safety effect”.
Table 1. System development assurance level assignment
Failure Condition Classification
System development Assurance 
level
Catastrophic A
Hazardous/Severe Major B
Major C
Minor D
No safety effect E
System architectural features, such as redundancy, monitoring, or partitioning, may be used to eliminate or 
contain the degree to which an item contributes to a specific failure condition. System architecture may reduce 
the complexity of the various items and their interfaces and thereby allow simplification or reduction of the 
necessary assurance activity. If architectural means are employed in a manner that permits a lower assurance 
level for an item within the architecture, substantiation of that architecture design should be carried out at the 
assurance level appropriate to the top-level hazard. This does not preclude assignment of item levels that are 
lower than the level associated with the top-level hazard.Tab 2 presents a series of example architectures and 
illustrate the effect those architectures may have on item development assurance level.
Compared with ARP 4754, when ARP 4754A assign DAL, first it proposes general guidelines of DAL 
assignment for aircraft and system. Secondly, it defines the concept of function development assurance level and 
item development assurance level. Thirdly it introduces the methods of assignment of Functional Development 
Assurance Level (FDAL) and Item Development Assurance Level (IDAL), including FDAL assignment without 
system architecture consideration and FDAL assignment with system architecture consideration. The 
prerequisites for a good understanding of FDAL (and IDAL) assignment are the definitions of Functional 
Failure Set, Members and Independence. 
Table 2. Examples of Architecturally Derived Assurance Levels and Constraints
Architecture
Failure Condition Classification
Catastrophic Severe-Major / Hazardous
1
Partitioned Design (Multiple
Failure Categories)
Level A for the system including
establishment of the partition
Level B for the system including establishment 
of the partition
Within each partitioned portion
Level corresponds to the most severe 
failure condition classification within 
that partitioned portion
Level corresponds to the most severe failure 
condition classification within that
partitioned portion
2
Dissimilar, Independent Designs 
Implementing an Aircraft-Level 
Function
Level A for the system including
establishment 
of dissimilarity and independence
Level B for the system including
establishment 
of dissimilarity and
independence
Item(s) Level B Level C
3
Dissimilar Designs Implementing 
an Aircraft Level Function 
Level A for the system including
establishment of partition between the 
portions
Level B for the system including establishment 
of partition between the portions
Primary Portion
Secondary Portion
Level A
Level B
Level B
Level C
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4 Active/Monitor Parallel Design Level A for the system Level B for the system
Active and Monitor Portions
At least one portion to Level A; the other 
portion to at least Level C
At least one portion to Level B; the other 
portion to at least Level C
5 Backup Parallel Design Level A for the system Level B for the system
Primary Portion
Backup Portion
Level A
Level C
Level B
Level D
Independence between aircraft/system functions or items can protect against potential common mode Errors 
and is a fundamental attribute to consider when assigning Development Assurance Levels. The intent of 
Independence attributes is to have sufficient confidence that the likelihood of a common mode Error is
minimized between two or more members commensurate with the severity of the Failure Condition 
Classification.Functional Independence ensures that the Function requirements should not suffer from a 
common Error, whereas item Development Independence ensures that the development of items on which the 
Function(s) is (are) implemented, should not suffer from a common mode Error.
The FDAL and IDAL assignment process flow chart shown in Fig4 and Fig5. The FDAL assignment of top-
level function is the same as the DAL assignment in ARP 4754, as shown in Table 1. The assignment principle 
of the development assurance level is shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Development assurance level assignments
Top-level 
failure 
condition 
classification
Development assurance level
Functional 
failure sets with 
a single 
member
Functional failure sets with multiple member
OPTION 1 OPTION 2
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Catastrophic FDAL A FDAL A for one Member, additional
Member(s) contributing to the top-level
Failure Condition at the level associated with 
the most severe individual effects of an error 
in their development process for all applicable 
top-level Failure Conditions (but no lower 
than level C for the additional Members).
FDAL B for two of the Members leading to top-
level Failure Condition. The other Member(s) at 
the level associated with the most severe 
individual effects of an error in their 
development process for all applicable top-level 
Failure Conditions (but no lower than level C for 
the additional Member(s)).
Hazardous/
Severe Major
FDAL B FDAL B for one Member, additional
Member(s) contributing to the top-level
Failure Condition at the level associated with 
the most severe individual effects of an error 
in their development processfor all applicable 
top-level Failure Conditions (but no lower 
than level D for the additional Members).
FDAL C for two of the Members leading to top-
level Failure Condition. The other Members at 
the level associated with the most severe 
individual effects of an error in their 
development process for all applicable top-level 
Failure Conditions (but no lower than level D for 
the additional Members).
Major FDAL C FDAL C for one Member, additional
Member(s) contributing to the top-level
Failure Condition at the level associated with 
the most severe individual effects of an error 
in their development process for all applicable 
top-level Failure Conditions.
FDAL D for two of the Members leading to top-
level Failure Condition. The other Members at 
the level associated with the most severe 
individual effects of an error in their 
development process for all applicable top-level 
Failure Conditions.
Minor FDAL D FDAL D for one Member, additional Member(s) contributing to the top-level Failure Condition at 
the level associated with the most severe individual effects of an error in their development process 
for all applicable top-level Failure Conditions.
No Safety 
Effect
FDAL E FDAL E
Note: The Functional Failure Set (FFS) is used to identify combinations of members which may lead to each 
Failure Condition and assign the appropriate rigor to mitigate the potential Errors.
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a. Select a FC from the FHA
B. Assign top FDAL per Tab 1
c. Identify the 
Functional Level FFSs
d. Select a FFS
e. Does the FFS have 
Multiple Members?
f. Are Functional 
ndependence claims
valid?
h. Assign FDAL to FFS Members per 
Option 1 or Option 2 of Tab 3
g. Assign FDAL to FFS Member
Per Column 2 of Tab 3
j. Have all the 
FCs from the FHA
been assessed?
i. Have all FFSs 
For the Selected FC 
been assessed?
k. Ensure the FDAL 
assignments satisfy all FCs 
in the FHA
A
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
Fig. 4. FDAL assignment process
l. Select a FC from the FHA
m. Identify FFSs associated with Items or 
combined Items and Functions
n. Select a FFS
o. Does the FFS have
Multiple Members?
p. Are the Item 
Development Independence
claims valid and have the Functional 
Independence claims been 
maintained?
q. Assign IDAL to FFS Members as per 
Option 1 or Option 2 of Table 3 and
Additional Considerations 
s. Have all FFSs 
For the Selected FC 
been assessed?
t. Have all the FCs 
from the FHA been 
assessed?
u. Finish When all FCs have been addressed, and FDALs 
and IDALs have been assigned to Members of all FFSs 
r. Assign IDAL to the FFS Member 
per Column 2 of Table 3
A
yes
yes
yes
yes
No
No
No
No
Fig. 5. FDAL assignment process
For systems that provide protection against an external event to the aircraft design In addition to Failure 
Conditions related to erroneous operation or activation of the protection Function, there are at least two failure 
conditions to consider:
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z Loss of protection combined with the external event: The FHA needs to consider the classification. The 
FDAL of the protection Function protecting against the external event can be assigned based on Fig 6.
z Loss of protection alone: The FHA should consider the classification to reflect the reduction of safety 
margins (none, slight, significant or large) and impact on crew workload.
A
B
C
10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7 10-8 10-9 Probability of the external event
Legend˖CAT Top level Failure
HAZ Top level Failure
Fig. 6. Protection function FDAL assignment as a function of probability of an external event
When the loss of protection alone has no effect on the aircraft or crew capability to safely complete the 
missionˈthe level of reduction in safety margin can be evaluated considering the expected probability of the 
external event under protection: the more frequent the external event is, the higher the reduction in safety 
margin when the protection is lost. Fig 6 illustrates the relationship between these different attributes and 
provides guidelines on FDAL allocation when considering the loss of a protection Function (availability failure).
Compared with ARP 4754ˈARP 4754A describes assignment principle in detail and provides guidance to
carry out DAL assignment. Besides that, it also considers aircraft-level function, and introduces the concept and 
assignment of FDAL and IDAL which provides the interface between ARP 4754A and DO-178B/ED-12B, DO-
254/ED-80, this makes the process of assign DAL more easy and reasonable.
3. Conclusion and prospection
In order to conform the requirements of international standards and guidelines, and to meet the increasing 
needs of safety requirements for civil aircraft and system, SAE ARP4754 has been revised to form SAE ARP 
4754A.
SAE ARP 4754A has been revised on aspects of development plan, development process and integral process.
Meanwhile, it summarizes the general methods of civil aircraft and system from concept definition to 
certification process. In addition,for the DAL assignment, SAE ARP 4754A provides the procedure and 
principle in detail which can guide the development of civil aircraft and system.So it is of great significance for 
developing civil aircraft and system to satisfy airworthiness and safety requirements.
Via analysing the differences between SAE ARP 4754 and SAE ARP 4754A briefly, we can see that SAE 
ARP 4754A is more important and ease to use, so it will be widely used for the development of aircraft and 
systems sooner in the future.
But in order to well understand and better apply the standards to develop aircraft and systems, there is an 
intensive need to study SAE ARP 4754A more detail in the future, so we will do some more deep research about 
the SAE ARP 4754A sooner.
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